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Abstract: The state as a part of the socio-political system is expected to 
maintain the stability of the system and facilitate the delivery of public 
goods in the best interest of the populace. When the state fails in its 
responsibilities to effectively cater for the needs of the people or, when it 
fails in its socio-economic responsibility to the people, it is automatically 
calling for alternative to itself.  The abysmal failure of successive 
administrations in Nigeria to address the challenges of poverty, 
unemployment and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic 
nationalities, ultimately resulted to anger, agitation and violent crimes 
against the Nigerian state by some individuals and group. Boko Haram 
violence has exposed the fragility of the Nigerian state. The deadly Islamic 
group in Northern Nigeria which has embarked on suicide bombing, 
guerrilla warfare tactics, kidnapping, and all kinds of atrocities all in the 
bid to impose extreme Islamic ideas on Nigeria has led to the loss of 
several lives and properties, displaced many, destroyed hundreds of 
schools and government buildings and devastated an already ravaged 
economy in the North East, one of Nigeria‟s poorest regions. This paper 
emphasized the centrality of the state in the Boko Haram violence; it 
explains that the fragile character of the Nigerian state is responsible for 
the Boko Haram violence. It also explored the integrity as well as the 
efficacy of the state response to Boko Haram violence, as well as a critical 
look at the character and context of the Nigerian state. It adopts the 
qualitative methodology and deploys data from secondary sources. This 
paper however concludes that even if the state defeats Boko Haram 
terrorists, it might not be an end to the resistance against it. The reason is 
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that the structures and Institutions of the Nigerian state are designed in a 
way that gives room for dissent and anti state struggles, and until that 
context of fragility is addressed, even if Boko Haram violence is quelled, 
another is likely to arise. 
Keywords: Boko Haram, Fragility, Nigerian State, North East, Violence 
 
Introduction 
The Nigerian state is a state in constant 
crisis, there is never a hiatus from this; 
from the inception of the state till now, 
the state in Nigeria has been faced with 
one crisis or the other and the inability 
of the state revisit this context of 
violence and the neo-patrimonial 
character also explains the sequence of 
continuous violence from various group 
against the state. It is too simplistic an 
explanation that human condition 
problems are solely responsible for the 
various violence as that of Boko Haram 
experienced in Nigeria; such 
explanation does not take into 
consideration the character of state 
formation and the institutional basis of 
the state, its neo-patrimonial character. 
All these explain the fragile character of 
the Nigerian state and her inability to 
effectively put an end to the continued 
violence against it.  
 
The Boko Haram violence is one of 
such violence against the state, even 
now, their mode of operation, 
persistence and strategies has further 
exposed the fragility of the Nigerian 
state and the fact that it completely 
lacks the capacity to effect its manifest 
destiny of law and order, as well as the 
fact that it has completely lost the 
control of the monopoly of the 
instrument of violence. 
 
State fragility and the challenge posed 
by Boko Haram will be explored in this 
paper. The paper is divided into five 
sections. The first part introduces the 
context of fragility as well as explains 
the problem that necessitates the paper; 
the second section explores the various 
literatures on the current issue and the 
theoretical frame work. The third 
section critically explores character of 
the Nigerian state. The fourth section 
explains state fragility and the challenge 
of Boko Haram violence, while the last 
section gave suggested recommendation 
on how to deal with the issue. 
 
Introducing the Context of Fragility 
and Violence 
The state has a manifested destiny; only 
she has the capacity to create an 
enabling environment for development. 
Though in modern times, the state is not 
the only institution that is responsible 
for development, but it is the only 
institution that is responsible for 
creating the enabling environment for 
advancement and improvement in 
human condition and economic qua 
social development (Ninalowo, 2010). 
The state is a force within society with 
coercive powers and monopoly of 
force; it is the only institution with this 
power. Even the state is a class within 
the various classes that permeates 
society, but the state as a class rises 
above society and mediates between the 
various classes in the society, thus the 
state is a neutral class, it is a neutral 
institution and it is also the medium of 
expression for the society and its 
various institutions and classes.  
 
The state mediates between the various 
classes in the society on contractual 
basis since the state is expected to be a 
product of a social contract or call it a 
societal contract. The state determines 
politics, it is itself political and 
responsible for the allocation of values 
in the society, the state determines who 
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gets what, when and how of society‟s 
limited resources. The life of the 
individual in the state is been 
influenced by this core responsibility of 
the state since in the Aristotelian 
parlance, an individual has no life 
outside the state, it is the state that gives 
him humanity, the absence of the state 
makes him vice versa. 
 
Ninalowo (2010) posited that inability 
of the state to effectively perform its 
responsibilities thus fulfilling its own 
part of the social contract has led to 
chaos and crisis in some parts of the 
world, specifically insecurity at all 
levels of human existence and the 
worsening of the human conditions in 
some places in the world. This inability 
has led to the emergence of none state 
organizations which manifest as 
insurgent groups or terrorist 
organizations acts as resistance to the 
state and has continually question the 
legitimacy of the state and its power to 
exercise its manifest destiny. They have 
arisen to question the monopoly of the 
state as a dominant institution that 
determines the affairs of men. As they 
are of the opinion that the state has 
failed woefully in its responsibility to 
them and therefore they seek for a right 
to determine their lives, they make 
immediate demands on the state and 
they expect to get it in time, the 
inability of the state to meet up with 
their demands often leads to violence 
and unconstitutional activities, some 
even go to the extent of demanding 
their own neutral existence, a state of 
their own independent of the state of the 
commonwealth. The core of the matter 
here is that the inability of the state to 
meet up with its responsibility often 
creates a backlash in the form of groups 
carrying out violence against it to seek 
their own ends on their own. 
 
Osaghae (2010) in his examination of 
the concept of state fragility alludes that 
when one considers the state as the 
mainstay of political order, her roles are 
justifiable, but the challenge has always 
been that the state has not always been 
able to play the roles expected of it. 
Perhaps this is reasons why some of 
these states have been typified as failed, 
weak and rogue, thus associating them 
with underdevelopment. The argument 
here is that the state has been unable to 
play its role and sometimes have even 
failed abysmally in this regard 
especially in the Somalian situation, 
therefore given rise to anti state groups. 
This is however very common in some 
clime especially in Africa of which our 
case Nigeria is a part.  
 
Brock et al (2012) stated that despite 
the heterogeneity in the world of states, 
there are some basic functions which all 
states are expected to fulfill in order to 
be qualified as states. Among these are 
the provision of both security and 
material well-being. Failure to provide 
these two public goods is not simply 
expressions of doing things differently 
but evidence of doing them badly. In 
this sense, the terminology of failed, 
weak, or fragile states is not descriptive, 
but also has a normative connotation: 
states are not functioning as they 
should. Thus the extent to which a state 
is able to fulfill that global historical 
mandate of promoting or enhancing the 
quality of life of the citizenry is a 
fundamental measure as to the degree to 
which such state is designated to be 
either responsible/successful or 
unsuccessful or constituting failure or 
failed state (Ninalowo, 2010). 
 
It is against this fundamental 
background or context that this paper 
would be examining the Nigerian state 
and its ambiguities, its fragility and 
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Boko Haram violence which have 
beclouded the peace of the country for 
more than a decade. 
Political violence, conflict, and crisis 
have become essential characteristics of 
the political process (Anifowoshe, 
1982). The Nigerian state has been a 
state in perpetual crisis given the nature 
of its formation; it has witnessed series 
of violence both political and terroristic. 
The violence ranges from the Kano 
Riots of 1953, to the census crisis, the 
1964 western election crisis and the 
organized pogroms of 1966 against the 
Ibos in the North. But in 1980, a group 
called the Maitatsine perpetuated 
violence in northern Nigeria, the stated 
aim of the sect was to confront 
materialism and purify the Islamic 
practice (Agbonifo, 2014).  
 
Boko-Haram though has had an uneasy 
reign of violence and terror in Nigeria, 
but has been responsible for the death 
of thousands in Nigeria despite efforts 
of the Nigerian security forces at 
tackling the menace. The point at which 
they transformed from being a radical 
religious organization in North-east 
Nigeria to being an insurgent terrorist 
organization having regional 
ramifications with global connection 
has been a subject of contestation. The 
role of the state in this, and its response 
has also been controversial. Boko 
Haram had perpetrated violence not 
only in the North-eastern part of the 
country which is their home, given the 
terrain, but also in some core northern 
states like Kano, Niger, Sokoto and 
even the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja.  
Scholars defer on when Boko-Haram 
started in Nigeria, but there is a 
consensus that though it could actually 
be traced beyond 2002 but 2002 marked 
the beginning of their activities in the 
country. They became militant in 2009 
after the gruesome killing of their 
leader, Mohammed Yusuf by the 
Nigerian Security Establishment and 
since then they have rained terror and 
violence on Nigeria with impunity in 
spite of the efforts of the state at 
curbing and eradicating them. 
 
The Nigerian state has thus failed to 
live up to its responsibility, it has been 
helpless in the face of this crisis and 
have only resorted to the use of the 
conventional military method of 
curbing this menace which has yielded 
no result. The state has failed to identify 
the major causality for this violence or 
pretended not to know which is also 
responsible for its festering for this 
long. The argument is however that the 
fragile nature of the Nigerian state has 
made it impossible to address core 
socio-economic problems which has a 
concomitant effect on the economic 
environment and the social relations of 
the people, the Nigerian state is not a 
failed state in the example of Somalia 
and others, it is a fragile state that is not 
capable of enhancing development. 
Thus given rise to the various anti-state 
violence especially the Boko-Haram 
violence which is the core of this paper. 
 
Statement of Problem 
What kind of state is continually 
susceptible to crisis and immediately it 
is done with one; it is immediately 
faced with another? From independence 
till date, the state in Nigeria has 
continually experience one crisis or the 
other. The speed with which another 
raises its head after one is quelled is 
phenomenal. All these crises seem to 
always be the advanced form of the 
previous ones, thus no problem or 
challenge is effectively solved or 
eradicated.  
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The Boko Haram violence is an 
advanced form of the previous ones in 
the north eastern region such as 
maitatsine, Niger-Delta crisis might 
have worn a new cloak, but it has 
always been there, the Fulani 
herdsmen/pastoralist crisis has always 
been there and several other of such. 
One of the identifying characters of 
Nigerian state is susceptibility to crisis 
and lingering on of such. Within just 
seven years of independence the 
Nigerian state has exploded into several 
crises which culminated in the civil war 
of 1967, perhaps there is a context of 
violence; it is this context that explains 
the various wars fought within the 
territory of the state.  
 
The Nigerian state is not exempted 
from the above explanation, the fragile 
nature of the state in Nigeria has 
resulted in various form of 
sociopolitical violence and crises and 
also resistance against the Nigerian 
state, ranging from insurgency in the 
Niger-Delta staged by the militants to 
Boko-Haram. Hence the Nigerian state 
given its character and nature and the 
precarious nature of its fragility have 
found it difficult to effectively perform 
its duties, the consequence of which are 
the various manifestation of 
sociopolitical upheaval and violence, 
including Boko-Haram. The objective 
of this paper is to interrogate the fragile 
character of the Nigeria state and to see 
the extent it has exacerbated conflict.  
 
Review of Literature 
Before delving directly into Boko 
Haram, it is important to place the 
group inside Nigeria‟s larger context of 
varying social, economic, religious, and 
political factors in order to have a more 
nuanced understanding of why the 
group exists and where it is possibly 
headed. It is within this environment of 
challenges and enable Boko Haram 
operates, finds sanctuary, and draws 
recruits.  
 
Gourley, (2012:2) examined the 
operating environment of Boko Haram; 
he highlights the socio economic 
conditions that prevailed in Northern 
Nigeria and in Nigeria as a whole. He is 
of the opinion that these socio-
economic conditions gave rise to Boko 
Haram and sustains the group. The 
economic system in Nigeria according 
to him faces a substantial number of 
challenges which has translated into 
open protests to influence the political 
system. Illiteracy and poverty continue 
to ravage the northern region despite 
the efforts of various groups to curb 
them. The author also believes that the 
socio-economic conditions are not 
alone. They exist alongside religious 
issues and governance failure and 
political challenges created by rampant 
endemic political bribery and 
corruption at the local level. The 
concomitant effect of all these factors is 
the Boko Haram violence. Adesoji 
(2010) in similar vein, highlights these 
environmental conditions which are 
socio-economical, they include mass 
poverty, inequality of opportunities, 
improper use of resources, revulsion of 
injustice, lack of educational 
opportunities, ignorance, corruption and 
unemployment. Corroborating Gourley 
(2012) argument, Isa (2010) posits that 
states that are been affected by Boko 
Haram  activities as a result of abject 
poverty, lack of basic infrastructure, 
high level of illiteracy, unemployment, 
dwindling fortunes in agriculture as a 
result of the negative effect of climate 
change, the almajiri system of 
education and the unproductive nature 
of the northern economy. 
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Aliyu, Moorthy and Idris (2015) wrote 
that the key issues that gave birth to 
Boko Haram include poverty, 
corruption, unemployment among the 
youths, armed robbery, moral 
decadence and the problem of bad 
governance. Following this line of 
thought is Sope Elegbe; the research 
director of the Nigerian Economic 
Summit Group (NESG) who posits that 
rising poverty in Nigeria is 
accompanied by increasing 
unemployment. Unemployment is 
higher in the north than in the south; 
this alongside radical Islam explains 
growing violence in the north (as cited 
in Oxford research group, 2011, p. 4). It 
is obvious from the foregoing that 
socio-economic factors which are 
obvious creation of the nature and 
character of the existing state in Nigeria 
are responsible for the anomaly called 
Boko Haram violence or insurgency.  
 
These crops of scholars are of the 
opinion that the major factor 
responsible for the upsurge of the Boko 
Haram violence is the condition of the 
human life which basically point to 
their socio-economic well-being. In 
similar vein, Bintube (2015) in a  
survey carried out in the north-eastern 
region disclosed that the root cause of 
Boko Haram phenomenon is the 
inherent self-sustaining nature of its 
driving force stemming from ignorance, 
poverty and illiteracy. He buttressed his 
argument with empirical evidence when 
he argued that socio-economic factors 
were the major influences responsible 
for the insurgency; which a lot of 
scholars have agreed that these social 
economic factors is the root causes of 
Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. 
 
The London Times (Anonymous 2010) 
saw the uprising as symptom of the 
social breakdown that has made Nigeria 
so prone to violence (As cited in 
Abimbola, 2010 p. 7). Still on the 
socio-economic thesis, Achebe (2012, 
p. 250) believes that the economic 
deprivation and corruption in the north 
warrant Boko Haram. To him, these 
twin problems produce and exacerbate 
financial and social inequities in a 
population, which in turn stimulate 
political instability. Arguing from this 
point of view, the Boko-haram implore 
all kinds of religion tactics, 
fundamentalism to sway the local 
citizenry that they are fighting an holy 
war, thus gaining sympathy and also 
increased their recruitment and support 
base, which they capitalize by adopting 
the unconventional warfare tactics to 
unleash havoc on the lives of ordinary 
citizens. 
Agbiboa (2013) also submits that 
relative deprivation and the history of 
Militant Islam is responsible for the 
Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. Aliyu, 
Morthy and Idris (2015) contend that 
bad governance, poverty, corruption, 
unemployment among the youths, 
armed robbery, and moral decadence 
are the root causes of Boko Haram. The 
Oxford Research Group also share the 
same line of argument in their work on 
Boko Haram, they believe that the 
socio-economic context should be given 
more emphasis in the analysis of the 
Boko Haram violence. Harnischfeger 
(2014) posits that the young militants in 
Maiduguri or Potiskum have good 
reasons to hate the representatives of 
the state. He wrote that their rebellion is 
born out of poverty, illiteracy, and 
unemployment; hence a response to 
social neglect. Harnischfeger however 
puts a poser which would lead us to the 
next strands of arguments in literatures. 
He stated that interpreting the rebellion 
as a protest against the declining living 
conditions is not in consonance with the 
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statements of Boko Haram leaders who 
insists that the insurrection is religious. 
 
What can be stated absolutely about 
Boko Haram is that it represents an 
element of the Nigerian Muslim 
dominationism that has not been 
satisfied with the current state of the 
imposition of Sharia since 2000. Its 
believe hold considerable appeal to 
dissatisfied elements throughout 
Northern Nigeria (Cook, 2011).  
 
This is a deviation from the socio-
economic poverty thesis which seems to 
be a general opinion. Cook (2011)  
brought our attention to something far 
more critical not only in the context of 
the Sharia argument but in the direction 
of the fact that there could be some less 
considered issues which could serve as 
explanation to the violence in Nigeria. 
The Sharia line of argument was total in 
his work; he was however convinced 
beyond doubt that the Sharia factor is 
primary in the consideration of the 
Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. He 
however alluded to the frustration felt 
by Muslims that none of the northern 
states in Nigeria have effectively 
implement Sharia which perhaps is the 
reason for the rise of Boko Haram, first 
in Maiduguri and then throughout the 
Northeast part of Nigeria. 
 
Succinctly speaking, the failure to 
effectively implement the Sharia law in 
the Northern region is probably the 
reason for the emergence of Boko 
Haram. Following this line of argument 
is Abimbola (2010); who expressed it in 
the context of partisan politics and 
political patronage, he argued that the 
introduction of Sharia in some parts of 
Northern Nigeria beginning from 1999 
appear to inspire closeness between 
Yusuf and the ruling class since their 
decision aligned with his plan to 
promote strict adherence to Islamic law, 
but he was disappointed at the type of 
Sharia introduced which fall short of his 
standards, thus putting him in a 
situation to reach a conclusion that the 
ruling elites were not serious Muslims 
or that their western education was 
hindering or limiting their commitment. 
He continued in his line of Sharia 
politico thesis citing Omipidan (2009) 
who posits that Yusuf‟s fraternization 
with the political class possibly 
informed his willingness to use his 
group to assist the political elite to 
secure political power that would in 
turn be used to protect and possibly 
advance his career. His abandonment 
by the political class could have 
hastened his dissent to violence to 
effect change.  
 
McConnell (2009) posits that failure to 
attach the Sharia based law to social 
welfare schemes, the implication of 
which would mean that the dividends of 
Sharia are not forthcoming; the reality 
of this is the radicals stepping in to 
demand fully beneficial Islamic state 
(as cited in Abimbola, 2010). Barna 
(2014) having cited socio-economic 
factors as necessitating Boko Haram 
also contend that the implementation of 
the Sharia law is considered by some as 
incomplete and lacking in meaning as it 
is not effectively dealing with the 
fundamental issues like corruption or 
poverty, she further stated the lack of 
connection between the Sharia law and 
a social welfare system in states in 
Northern Nigeria is cited as a potential 
reasons for Yusuf‟s dissatisfaction with 
its introduction, hence falling short of 
his standards. Dearn (2011) also 
submits that there is no doubt that many 
Muslims were not satisfied with the 
adoption of Sharia law in 12 northern 
states between 1999 and 2001, because 
they felt it was either too watered down 
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and discriminatory in favour of the rich 
and highly placed or that the whole of 
the Nigerian state should have been 
Islamized.  
 
Harnischfeger (2014) also argued 
following this line of thought posit that 
at the height of the Sharia campaign, 
most political and religious leaders in 
the far north supported the introduction 
of harsher Islamic laws, yet made sure 
that these laws were implemented only 
in a selective and half-hearted way. The 
politicians are however responsible for 
Boko Haram because of the political 
gimmicks they played in the adoption 
of Sharia, they did not go for Sharia 
because they wanted religious 
purification in the north but for political 
motives, and then when they could not 
put Sharia into full practice nor 
continue with it, they set ablaze the 
incendiary centrifugal forces of 
religious fanatism cum violence that we 
are all witnessed to.  
 
It would be very difficult to leave out 
the Sharia thesis in the blossoming of 
the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria, 
especially giving the insincerity of the 
politicians in its application and 
adoption without due regards to the 
religious atmosphere of the North. The 
moment they introduced Sharia, they 
gave room for divisive tendencies that 
they might not be able to engage nor 
handle, they empowered radical Islamic 
groups who also seized this opportunity 
of Sharia to advance their interests. 
Harnischfeger contends that no 
Northern Muslim wants to leave in a 
Taliban-like regime even though they 
find it difficult to formulate an 
alternative if they distance themselves 
from the militants, it does not however 
mean that the Militants could count on 
widespread support. In other words, as 
Montclos (2014,) argue that the radical 
form of Sharia that Boko Haram wants 
to impose does not correspond at all to 
the demand of a very large majority of 
Nigerian Muslims, which has been 
openly criticized by Islamic clerics. The 
core of the matter is that all hell was let 
loose when Sharia was introduced. 
 
Another perspective on Boko Haram 
violence in Nigeria from literatures is 
that expressed by Kukah (2012), a 
scholarly clergyman from Northern 
Nigeria, he is of the view that bad 
governance is responsible for the Boko 
Haram violence in Nigeria. He went 
further by reiterating the effect of bad 
governance, corruption, total lack of 
security and welfare have all constitute 
the reality of our daily lives, thus in the 
eyes of the sect members, the persistent 
corruption, collapse of public morality, 
injustice and so on could only be 
attributed to those who govern. They 
thus reason that those who govern us 
have acquired their tools by gaining 
western education. The author argued 
(As cited in Agbiboa, 2013, p. 9).  
 
Ojukwu (2011) submits that naturally, 
conflicts and violence can set in, in a 
state where there is crisis of governance 
and bad leadership which might be 
what elicited or provoked the current 
political disorder in the Northern 
region. The author argued that bad 
governance is one of the most 
theoretical explanations for state 
collapse. According to him, the 
phenomenon of governance emphasizes 
leadership, the manner in which 
political state leaders manage, use or 
misuse power to promote economic 
development or pursue agenda that 
undermine such goals. The author 
explained that governance must be 
reflective of the various institutions that 
pervade the state, hence to him, there 
would not be good governance if there 
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is no good leadership; the absence of 
both is responsible for the violence of 
Boko Haram. Hence, the emergence of 
Boko Haram is a direct consequence of 
government failure to provide the basic 
human needs of the citizenry (Ugwu, 
2015). He continued by stating that the 
prevalence of abject and dehumanizing 
poverty; bad governance; high rate of 
unemployment; hunger and disease; 
rising tides of social unrest among 
others are the indicators of the failure of 
governance which according to him 
have created the breeding ground for 
the rise and escalation of Boko Haram 
insurgency.  
 
Ilechukwu (2014) also surmised that 
corruption in government, unfavourable 
state of the economy among other 
factors is responsible for the 
radicalization of Boko Haram. Muzan 
(2014) in addition argued on a general 
note that religious & ideological 
discontent, political alienation, 
unemployment, poverty and 
discrimination are causative factors of 
insurgency in Nigeria. Council of 
foreign relations in the United States 
(2010, 2011) submits that governance 
failures is often how extremist groups 
have historically taken hold, resulting in 
political gains, as exemplified by 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in 
Palestine. (as cited in Gourley 2012, p. 
4) 
 
In similar vein, Clinton (2009, p.1) on 
her visit to Nigeria noted that the most 
immediate source of disconnect 
between Nigeria‟s wealth and its 
poverty is the failure of governance at 
the federal, state and local level….lack 
of transparency and accountability has 
eroded the legitimacy of the 
government and contributed to the rise 
of groups that embrace violence and 
reject the authority of the state (As cited 
Agbiboa, 2013). 
 
Oviasogie (2013) took a radical state-
centric turn when he argue that state 
failure is responsible for Boko Haram 
activities in Nigeria; He went further to 
state that the characterization of Nigeria 
as a failed state has impacted in making 
it a breeding ground for terrorism. The 
problem with this line of argument is 
that even the author finds it difficult to 
reach a  conclusion on whether Nigeria 
is actually a failed state especially given 
the fact that the various 
conceptualizations of a failed state 
depicts a situation of anarchy and loss 
of the state coercive powers. He stated 
again causal factors such as corruption, 
poverty and ignorance as causatives of 
terrorism even after the state failure 
thesis; this is however contradictory 
since the state failure thesis is inclusive 
of the causatives he outlined. Also, the 
fact that a state possesses the characters 
of corruption, poverty and ignorance 
does not make it failed; hence, the 
emergence of Boko Haram does not 
necessarily mean that Nigeria is a failed 
state. All these further expose the 
controversial nature of the state-failure 
thesis. 
 
In similar vein, Okorie and Adebanjo 
(2014) argued contrary to the above line 
of thought, he opined that the Nigerian 
state is not failed but fragile, as the 
characterization given for its failure 
only reinforces its fragility; 
characteristics such as poverty, 
corruption, low economic growth, 
unstable and divided population, 
legitimacy crisis, weak and ineffective 
and unstable political institutions and 
bad governance. All these are product 
of the crisis of governance in the 
context of state-fragility. 
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The International Crisis Group (2014) 
also contends that the socio-economic 
conditions of resource curse and 
rampant, entrenched corruption 
constitute the context from which Boko 
Haram emerged. The group noted as it 
has done in previous reports that “bad 
governance, sustained economic 
hardship; rising inequality and social 
frustration are fostering the growth of 
radical extremist groups|” (p.  8). 
According to the group, there is a 
complicated link between politics, 
governance, corruption, poverty and 
violence in Nigeria. They also cited 
declining human development 
resources, growing alienation and 
radicalization as factors to be 
considered in the emergence of Boko 
Haram. 
 
Another interesting work is that of the 
United States Institute for Peace Special 
Report (2012,). They believe that Boko 
Haram is a creation of violence which 
was perpetrated against it by the 
Nigerian state. The institute is of the 
opinion that the way the Nigerian State 
handled the Boko Haram group is 
responsible for their resorting to 
violence. They opined that weakness in 
the institutions of politics and the 
security services creates a political 
situation where such threats to stability 
are not dealt with until violence is a 
certainty. Their only method of dealing 
with any threat against the state is 
violence. Boko Haram according to the 
institute was created under these 
circumstances. Aliyu et al (2015) also 
contends that political, external forces 
and lack of counter insurgency 
approach by the Nigerian government 
which are busy fighting the symptoms 
and not the root causes have been 
identified as some of the major factors 
which has contributed in worsening the 
situation in the north eastern part of 
Nigeria.  
Insurgency in Nigeria is unconnected 
with frustration caused by high rate of 
poverty, unemployment, weak 
governance, religious fanatism and 
Islamic catechism known in Arabic as 
the Almajirai system, social inequality 
among others (Okoli et al, 2014, 
Akinbi, 2015). Aro (2013) in similar 
vein argued extensively that the same 
factors responsible for the emergence of 
other militant armed groups in Nigeria 
are also responsible for the emergence 
of Boko Haram. In fact, He took a 
cynical stance when he argued that 
Boko Haram is not the first militant 
group to arise in Nigeria and would not 
be the last, the reason he cited was that 
the factors that creates enabling 
environment for militant insurgency 
still persist in the country. These factors 
according to him are: ideology, 
unemployment, poverty, corruption and 
lack of development, fictitious fact and 
ignorance, failure of governance and 
good leadership, social justice, 
marginalization and neglect, human 
right violation and frustration. Aro 
defined fictitious facts as those facts 
that do not directly or physically exist; 
their existence can only be proved with 
the instrument of faith. They are facts 
that cannot be directly confirmed. Aro 
also reiterated a point espoused by the 
United States Institute For peace which 
opined that Boko Haram is a product of 
the Nigerian state, particularly the way 
they were handled by the state security 
apparatus. The implication of this 
argument is that Boko Haram as it is 
today is as a result of the way they were 
handled by the Nigerian security forces. 
Hence Boko Haram metamorphosing 
from a Dawah to an arms-bearing sect 
was in part the making of the Nigerian 
security forces which approach the 
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situation as one of law and order and 
thus responded as such, there was no 
attempt to see the issues raised by the 
movement in a broader multifaceted 
prism as political, social and economic 
(Mohammed, 2014).  
 
Following this comprehensive state 
centric causative, Stevenson (2014, p. 
3) in a comparative study of Boko 
Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab stated 
that these three groups emerged out of 
crisis within their respective states. He 
went ahead to state specifically in page 
25 of his study that the rise of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria could be traced to the 
challenges of governance in the North 
east, aggressive police response and 
prison breaks. But one would probably 
not be surprised giving the nature and 
character of the Nigerian state, the state 
itself is a law and order state, that is its 
colonial tradition and formative 
character, thus the post-colonial 
Nigerian fragile state is not different.  
 
Mohammed in the process of setting a 
background for the emergence of Boko 
Haram by an examination of historical 
Islamic dynamics in Northern Nigeria 
argued thus:  
The development of radical 
Islamist ideology in North-eastern 
Nigeria has drawn its inspiration 
from both internal and external 
sources. The external factors 
include the worldwide resurgence 
of radical Islam owing to the US 
global war on terror and the 
general decline in the living 
conditions in Muslim-majority 
countries, coupled with internal 
economic problems of urban 
destitution and rural decay in this 
part of Nigeria. A large pool of 
Almajirai and urban unemployed 
were conducive to the emergence 
of Boko Haram (Mohammed, 
2014, p 30). 
 
Hence following Stevens‟s (2014) 
argument, the Nigerian state is a state in 
crisis, this crisis which is not exactly 
absence of law and order or violence 
simply means failure of governance or 
the continuous and consistent 
incapacity of government to deliver 
public goods. It is in this atmosphere of 
incongruity and failure and crisis that 
Boko Haram emerges. 
Akuva, Zumve and Ingyoroko (2013) 
argued critically that corruption and 
dysfunctional state system is singularly 
responsible for terrorism in Nigeria. 
They believed that the root cause of 
terrorism in Nigeria is corruption and 
they collectively agreed that intellectual 
effort should be focused on the official 
corruption and if there is any need to do 
critical analysis on the emergence of 
Boko Haram. They surmised that 
economic deprivation, marginalization, 
frustration, and desperation experienced 
by the larger population of Nigeria 
which is a consequence of official 
production are the fundamental cause of 
terrorism in the present day Nigeria. 
Hence Boko Haram violence (my 
emphasis) is the underlying function of 
prolonged failure of the Nigerian state 
to deliver purposeful good governance. 
They added that religious and ethnic 
factors cannot be ignored as factors to 
be considered causatives of terrorism in 
Nigeria.  
 
 
Adelabu & Oladele (2015) in line with 
the following argument also contend 
that terrorism (Boko Haram violence) 
which started as a form of state backed 
violence is a threat to the Polity. The 
nature and character of the Nigeria state 
is an invitation or call to anarchy which 
has led to political landscape open to 
various surge of uprisings and conflicts. 
Due to the pluralist nature of Nigeria 
state, the issue of religion and ethnicity 
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is now been implored as a protest 
groups under various disguises.  
They reiterated that the greatest asset 
the Boko Haram sect has is the level of 
unemployment, infrastructural decay 
and official insensitivity to poor 
Nigerian. Oarhe (2013) reasoned that 
Nigeria with its ready pools of 
unemployed labour force, exploitative 
and unrepentant politicians, radical 
fundamentalist; large chunk of 
population prone to violence offers 
competitive advantage for militant and 
terrorist organizations. Hence, 
according to him, Boko Haram 
insurgency is provoked and reproduced 
by diverse factors, many of them 
mutually interactive. They include new 
patterns of social inequality; disjunctive 
process of democratization; criminal 
networks and other adverse effects of 
globalization and also, the perverse 
effects of mass media. Chinwokwu 
(2013) cited executive lawlessness, neo 
imperial elites, government insincerity 
and insensitivity, marginalization, 
unemployment and underemployment, 
absolute poverty, oppression among 
others as the root causes of Boko 
Haram violence in Nigeria. Hence, it is 
therefore partly the failure on the part of 
the leadership in the North and 
government to uphold the tenets of 
constitutions as contained in sections 16 
and 17 of the 1999 constitution that has 
produced the social upheavals and 
terror that confronts the country 
(Adigbuo 2014). He added that this is 
what informed many analysts to argue 
that the principal cause of Boko Haram 
zealotry is the systemic failure of the 
political leadership to solve the nagging 
problem of poverty in the land.  
 
Islam must however be examined 
through the prism of conservatism, 
modernism and fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism is the most marginal. 
It perceived the existing political 
system as not effective and corrupt. The 
fundamentalist cite dysfunctional 
condition of the Nigerian state as the 
reasons for their actions (Chalk, 2004 as 
cited in Adigbuo, 2014, p. 3).  
 
The existing literatures also do not 
consider the nature and character of the 
Nigerian state as it pertains to the rise 
of Boko Haram violence which would 
be interrogated in the present paper, the 
present work aim at unifying all these 
arguments and subsume them in the 
context of state fragility which would 
also bring to the fore other political 
economic issues that are culprit in the 
phenomenon of Boko Haram violence. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
For this work, the Structural Functional 
theory is adopted as a framework of 
analysis. Structural functionalism has a 
sociological background. It developed 
from the works of Radcliffe-Brown, 
Talcott Parsons, and Robert K Merton. 
But it was brought into political science 
through the works of Easton, Gabriel 
Almond, and Coleman etc. Structural 
functionalism envisions society as a 
system of interconnected parts and they 
stress how these different parts work for 
the good of the system. Almond 
alongside his colleagues, Coleman and 
Powell on different occasions had 
explained the structural functionalist 
theory. Almond and Powell in 1960 
using structural functionalism compared 
political systems in developing and 
developed areas. In the process, they 
see the state as a political system, 
instead of powers with its legal 
connotation, they used functions, 
instead of offices they used roles; 
instead of institutions which direct 
thinking towards formal norms, they 
used structures and instead of public 
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opinion and citizenship training, they 
preferred political culture and 
socialization. They described political 
system as that which allocates values by 
means of policies; the allocations are 
authoritative; and its authoritative 
allocations are binding on society as a 
whole (Fisher, 2010). Almond contends 
that political systems perform input and 
output functions. The input functions 
are: Interest articulation; interest 
aggregation; while the output functions 
are: rule making, rule adjudication, rule 
implementation. The system also 
performs the function of political 
communication, system maintenance 
and adaptation functions through 
political socialization and recruitment 
of people. 
 
The fulcrum of Structural 
Functionalism theory is that systems 
which is an elaborate connotation for 
state has inbuilt structures which carry 
out designed functions for the survival 
of the state or political system. There is 
an organic relationship between these 
structures to the extent of an 
interrelated functioning so as to avoid 
system failure or system collapse. 
Hence, chaos arises if any part of the 
political system fails to perform it 
function. 
 
The state itself is part of societal system 
and it could be considered as a political 
system. As a part of the societal system, 
there are functions expected of it to 
maintain the stability of the system. 
Systemic failure arises when the state 
fail in its responsibility to perform its 
functions. And as political system, the 
state becomes endangered when the 
structures of the state witness challenge 
in the performance of their functions. 
 
Based on this theory, one can attempt 
an explanation that the structures of the 
Nigerian state has failed in its manifest 
functions to maintain the political 
system. The Boko Haram violence 
shows a lot about this failure in the 
political system 
 
From the above explanation, the 
theoretical frame work of analysis 
explains that the fragility of the state is 
the fragility of the political systems and 
the structures whose designed functions 
determines its stability, the inability of 
the parts that makes up the political 
system to effectively perform the 
functions of input, output and system 
maintenance has affected the delivery 
of good governance that are capable of 
delivering public goods in the interest 
of the populace, hence, resistance and 
protest against the state such as Boko 
Haram violence. This extrapolation is 
not stressing the complete failure of the 
political system but rather the 
ineffectiveness and decay of the parts. 
This puts the state in a situation of 
fragility with dialectical conflictual 
patterns of actions and structures with 
political processes that legitimizes 
inequality and negative human 
conditions. This enmeshed the state in a 
cesspool of crisis and violence, against 
itself and against the people, 
consequently leading to such realities as 
the Boko Haram violence. 
 
The Character of the Nigerian State 
The Nigerian state no doubt is a 
colonial infrastructure. It is an imposed 
state with an imperialist agenda. The 
colonial state however is a necessary 
infrastructure that was designed to 
remedy the hailing western capitalism. 
It was actually not meant to engender 
any meaningful development. The 
Nigerian state in its inception is not 
only a distorted version of the state but 
it also facilitated the distortion of 
existing local pre-colonial structures. It 
was Olowu (1994) that argued that 
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colonization has been the most 
important factor in the evolution of the 
modern African state. He added that 
colonialism sets the boundaries of the 
state, provided it with state structure, 
constitution, governance systems, 
bureaucracy, etc., as well as linked 
Africa with the global economy in a 
centre-periphery fashion. Hence, the 
structural weakness of African states 
can be traced to the colonial period and 
the peculiar nature of the political 
institutions that were imposed on the 
African societies by their colonial 
masters. Ekeh (1975) also alluded to 
this when he stated that it is to 
colonialism that any valid 
conceptualization of the nature of 
African politics must look. See also 
Alavi (1972) and Osaghae (1998).  
 
The colonial state immediately 
displaced the pre-colonial state; this 
was the aim if imperialism was to be 
effectively perpetuated. It not only 
displaced the existing structure but also 
distorts and attempts a structural 
disarticulation of these pre-colonial 
structures. In his analysis of the colonial 
state, Olowu (1994) argued strongly 
that the colonial state is a state of 
conquest, created and sustained by 
force of arms, its emergence displaced 
and bastardised pre-colonial state 
structures, this it did for two reasons 
which are: 
 
First, the colonial state was based 
on a theory of racial superiority 
best articulated in Lord Lugard‟s 
„dual mandate‟. It therefore had 
to supplant whatever „inferior‟ 
institution it met. Secondly, the 
colonial state was short of 
personnel even for the purpose of 
affecting its overriding agenda of 
extracting resources for the 
benefit of the metropole. To be 
able to secure law and order, it 
adopted an „indirect rule‟ system 
whereby local chiefs were 
transformed into local potentates 
with absolutist powers similar to 
those of the colonial governors, 
even where there were stateless 
societies, the colonial authorities 
created „warrant chiefs‟ (Olowu, 
1994, p. 6) 
 
It becomes easier to understand the 
dysfunctional character of the state 
system in Nigeria given the above 
historical exegesis. The character of the 
Nigerian state is a product of its 
colonial character, also, most of the 
characteristics of the colonial state also 
go for the post-colonial states since the 
state was inherited and not dismantled, 
it was just a mere change of baton. In 
addition, the colonial state from the 
above exposition is a law and order 
state and it explains the integration of 
the Nigerian state into the world 
capitalist system. 
 
This analysis of the nature of the 
Nigerian state reveals that over 
concentration of power at the centre at 
the expense of the centrifugal 
arrangement is responsible for the 
various violent resistance on the state 
which itself is a direct consequence of 
structural and institutional inequality 
and economic neglect. Danjuma (2014) 
argued that because of the despotic and 
overbearing character of political 
leaders in Africa, the state has been 
entangled in basic and obvious 
contradiction of too much concentration 
of power at the centre at the expense of 
weak economies or low economic 
performance. He further argued that the 
economic crisis in most African states 
gave rise to the emergence of 
opposition political bodies and interest 
groups that question the basis and 
legitimacy of their leaders. Danjuma 
cited Schraeda (2004)  
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The inabilities of most African leaders 
to meet with the yearnings and 
aspirations of her citizenry make the 
government rely heavily on the 
instruments of coercion in order to 
secure compliance. The struggle for 
power or access to the state resources 
eventually leads to sectarian violence in 
these countries. This further expands 
the problems of African states because 
it has greatly exposes their weaknesses, 
ineptitudes as well as their inability to 
maintain, defend and control their 
respective territories……. Some other 
studies on the nature of African states 
suggest lack of stable political system 
and development is responsible for the 
spate of political crisis in these 
countries. The failure of some of these 
states for instance Nigeria to perform or 
meet some of its basic functions and 
needs has been sole responsible for the 
creation of vigilante groups or ethnic 
militias that have been perpetuating 
violence against individual citizens 
(Danjuma, 2014).          
 
The complexities of politics in Nigeria 
and the incompatibility between the 
state as an offshoot of society and the 
society itself creates contradictions that 
endanger the continuity of the Nigerian 
project. This is a peculiar nature of 
most African states, What Ekeh called 
the two publics. Ekeh argued that: 
 
When one moves across western 
society to Africa, at least, one 
sees that the total extension of the 
western conception of politics in 
terms of a monolithic public 
realm morally bound to the 
private realm can only be made at 
conceptual and theoretical peril. 
There is a private realm in Africa. 
But this private realm is 
differentially associated with the 
public realm in terms of morality. 
In fact, there are two public 
realms in post-colonial Africa, 
with different types of moral 
linkages to the private realm. At 
one level is the public realm in 
which primordial groupings, ties, 
and sentiments influence and 
determines individual‟s public 
behaviour. I shall call this the 
primordial public…. The 
primordial public is moral and 
operates on the same moral 
imperatives as the private realm. 
On the other hand, there is a 
public realm which is historically 
associated with the colonial 
administration and which has 
become identified with popular 
politics in post-colonial Africa. It 
is based on civil structures: the 
military, the civil service, the 
police, etc. Its chief characteristic 
is that it has no moral linkages 
with the private realm. I shall call 
this the civic public. The civic 
public in Africa is amoral and 
lacks the generalized moral 
imperatives operative in the 
private realm and in the 
primordial public. The most 
outstanding characteristic of 
African politics is that the same 
political actors simultaneously 
operate in the primordial and the 
civic publics (Eke, 1975, p. 92-
93). 
 
Eke added that the dialectical 
relationship between the two publics 
foments the unique political issues that 
have come to characterize the nature of 
African state and its politics.  
 
The central issue in this analysis of the 
nature of the Nigerian state as a 
causative of insecurity is the fact that its 
incompatibility with the societal moral 
structure is as a result of the fact that it 
is a foreign infrastructure. It was not 
allowed to evolve from the societal 
legal structure but rather a product of 
colonialism; hence the institutions of 
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the state have a peculiar alien character. 
Thus according to Olowu (1994), the 
emphasis of this kind of distorted state 
seems to be on power to the exclusion 
of ethics and a complete reliance on 
western conceptions of authority and 
imported western institutions of 
government such as the legislature, 
executive, military etc., without the 
attending norms supporting them. This 
has alienated the African states from the 
past and the people.  
 
It is this disjuncture between the state 
and society that underlie the legitimacy 
crisis which debilitates the state in 
Africa (Osaghae, 1998). Hence the 
amoral nature of politics and the 
prevalence of two divisive publics in 
Nigeria are responsible for the 
contradictions that beset the Nigerian 
state. Insecurity is just one out of the 
numerous consequences of these 
contradictions. This according to Ake 
(1989) as cited in Olowu (1995) arises 
because the state belongs to few, it does 
not belong to all, and therefore a large 
portion of the society is stateless. The 
implication of this according to Olowu 
is that the state becomes non-
accountable and does not respond to the 
wishes of the people. As such, these 
stateless individuals (my emphasis) are 
subjected to the oppression of the 
strong ones. This generates violent 
clashes and weakens the capability of 
the central authority to maintain 
effective control over the people 
therefore giving rise to various 
typologies of the state (Danjuma, 2014).  
 
The Nigerian state is characterized by 
class inconsistencies and complexities 
as no class can effectively lay claim to 
it, it has a dysfunctional hegemonic 
class arrangement or order incapable of 
staring it out of crisis. No one single 
class can lay claim to the Nigerian state, 
hence, there is no hegemonic hold or 
influence. 
 
Another character of the Nigerian state 
as captured by Osaghae (1998) He 
posited that the federal system adopted 
in 1954 which has been in decline since 
late 1970s underlies some of the 
peculiar features of politics in Nigeria. 
Principal among these according to 
Osaghae is the legitimation of 
accomodationist demands which are 
intolerable in most other African states. 
This includes demands for equitable 
power, resource and power sharing, 
which frequently involve extra-
parliamentary tactics by aggrieved 
groups. Another of these features is the 
live and let live political culture which 
moderate political competition in a way 
that makes monopolization or 
domination of state power by a single 
group unacceptable.  
 
A third feature is the deflection of 
conflict of local nature to the states and 
local government leaving only conflict 
of national significance to the center. 
This federal character of Nigeria 
inherited from the colonizers has 
generated questions of national 
significance that has continued to query 
the logic and integrity of the Nigerian 
project. Call it national question but the 
fact is that they had their antecedents in 
the colonial state and since inception 
these questions have been a protest on 
the federal state and the Nigerian 
project. This thematic issue of state 
formation and its peculiar character 
explains the Boko Haram violence. It 
first and foremost infects the state with 
a fragile character which in turn 
explains the various violence and 
protest against the state of which Boko 
Haram violence is one in many. 
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State Fragility and the Challenge of 
Boko Haram Violence  
What kind of state is faced with the 
challenge of armed groups, in what kind 
of state would violence such as that of 
BH linger for long with many casualties 
and hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced persons? This paper has 
emphasized the fragility of the Nigerian 
state as an evidence to explain and 
justify the reason why it seems helpless 
and incapable in the face of BH 
violence. It is also worthy to note that 
one of the peculiarities of this fragile 
context of violence is that a fragile state 
begets contradiction and opposition for 
itself and even if it succeeds in quelling 
one, it is faced with another, this is 
because of its structures and neo-
patrimonial leadership who sees the 
state as a personal property to acquire 
private ends, therefore rendering a large 
portion of the population stateless. We 
defined this context as that of violence 
because right from its inception, the 
state in Nigeria is always in one crisis 
or the other, facing one armed group or 
the other. This context of violence 
breeds and sustains armed groups 
violence and also this violence 
reinforces state fragility. Having set a 
contextual background for the BH and 
other armed groups violence, the next 
step would be to interrogate the fragile 
context conceptually and examine the 
core characteristics of fragile states and 
then establishing the challenge posed by 
BH. 
 
Our connotation of fragility is in line 
with Brock et al (2012) which posits 
that the normal  connotation of 
ascribing a state has failed, weak  and 
fragile states is not only descriptive, but 
also has a normative connotation: states 
is not functioning and is not meeting up 
to her responsibilities.  In justifying the 
neo-patrimonial character of the fragile 
states, Brock et al (2012) stated that 
fragile states are dominated by social 
forces and political groups who use the 
language of modernity and 
development to give legitimacy and 
subsequent exploitation of the state as a 
source of private enrichment and 
accumulation, hence fragile states are 
states on the brink; they do not have 
what it takes to effectively perform the 
function of statehood, it is an 
ineffective state in a precarious 
condition, it is however not a failed 
state. Hence, fragile states are often 
characterized by ongoing violence and 
insecurity, a legacy of conflict, weak 
governance and inability to deliver 
public goods (World Bank, 2007 as 
cited in Mcloughlin, 2012, p. 8). 
 
Political instability, economic failure, 
social dislocation, institutional and 
policy weaknesses and failures are all 
integral elements of state fragility 
which by definition gives primacy to 
the political correlates of statehood 
(Osaghae 2010). He further argued that 
fragile state lacks the capacity to 
function as an effective or capable state. 
In order words, the emphasis of state 
fragility concept is not only on 
personality or leadership but on 
institutional capacity and structural 
functionality and efficacy. 
Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD suggests that 
states are fragile when state structures 
lack political will and/or capacity to 
provide the basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development and to 
safeguard the security and human rights 
of their populations (OECD 2007 as 
cited in Brock et al 2012). 
Osaghae argued that a fragile state 
cannot function effectively as a 
responsible state because it lacks the 
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capacity, he continued by citing von 
Einsiedel (2005, p. 15) who wrote that 
such state has lost its power to confer 
identity, lost its legitimacy and can no 
longer assure security. It is no longer 
able to maintain the monopoly of the 
instrument of violence (Ignatieff, 2002, 
p. 117 as cited in Osaghae 2010) and it 
is vulnerable to collapse and conflict, in 
order words, according to Osaghae, 
fragile states have the potential to self-
destruct, they are vulnerable to collapse. 
He cited some features of fragile states 
which are worth noting in this work, 
they are: 
- Weak and ineffective bureaucracy, 
civil service and public agencies; 
- Lack of capacity to enforce rules 
and regulations and exercise 
effective jurisdiction over its 
territory and to defeat/control 
opposition groups, militants, rebel 
forces, warlords, urban gangs and 
the like, leading to the recent 
concept of ungoverned territories; 
- Lack of capacity to extract surplus 
and taxes, and manage resources 
and the economy. 
- Endemic legitimacy crisis manifest 
in problematic national cohesion, 
unequal and contested citizenship, 
disorderly, inconclusive and violent 
elections, and contestations for state 
power as well as challenges to the 
validity of the state…… 
- Unstable and divided population 
torn apart by fractured social fabric, 
minimum social control and 
pervasive strife that encourage exit 
from rather than loyalty to the state. 
- Weak regulatory and conflict 
management institutions, including 
police and other security forces, 
credible judicial structures and 
access to justice, all of which 
encourage resort to conflict-ridden, 
violent, non-systemic and extra-
constitutional mode of grievance 
articulation and redress seeking. 
- Decay and collapse of physical and 
social infrastructure, especially the 
health, education and social service 
delivery sectors…. 
 
The Nigerian state evinces most of 
these characteristics, it is worthy of note 
to state that these characteristics did not 
just surface, they arise as a result of the 
peculiarity of the state creation process 
and has been there since the inception 
of the Nigerian state. It is this condition 
and context that necessitates the 
emergence of the radical Islamic group 
called Boko Haram and it would still be 
this condition that would give rise to a 
much more anti state armed group even 
if Boko Haram is defeated except if 
these conditions are collectively and 
immediately addressed. The logical 
reason is that fragile states fight war on 
several fronts and because of the 
flexibility of their social political 
enclaves and the already heated polity 
and the fact that the state does not have 
effective control over its territory, the 
instruments of violence freely comes in 
and go out at will creating an incendiary 
for a cesspool of violence. Fragile states 
like Nigeria are always at war but in 
their own case, they are always at war 
with themselves. Fragile states are held 
together by force of arm and usually 
have a very strong centre, the reason is 
that they cannot afford to have a weak 
centre or else, the already precarious 
mansion would fall like a pack of card. 
They are what Alavi (1972) called the 
law and order state or the 
overdeveloped state. Nigeria typifies 
this analysis. 
 
To further our analysis of the fragility 
of the Nigerian state, it might be 
necessary to take a critical look at the 
Fragile State Index by the Fund for 
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Peace. The organization examines state 
fragility in all countries of the world by 
looking at three core factors which are 
economic, social and political/military 
which are further divided into some sub 
groups. The higher the score, the 
greater the instability in such country 
and vice versa. The Fund for Peace 
argued that in spite of the peaceful 
election which was against all 
expectations, the underlying drivers 
have not gone away. One wonders what 
the organization meant by „underlying 
drivers,‟ In this case, they meant that 
the triggers of violence are still very 
much there, because the factors of 
fragility still remain and even if the 
state survives a stage, it is not a 
guarantee that it would sit back because 
it is a systemic thing which eventually 
triggers violence.  
 
Boko Haram has effectively taken 
advantage of this context of fragility 
and had become one of the deadliest 
terror groups in the world. They have 
defied all effort at taming theme and 
have resorted to suicide bombing of soft 
targets and deploy the tactics of 
unconventional warfare to unleash 
mayhem on Nigerians. 
 
For the year 2015, The Vanguard 
newspaper (July 12, 2015) reported that 
444 people were murdered by BH in 39 
days after President Mohammadu 
Buhari was inaugurated. Vanguard 
newspaper (September 21, 2015) also 
reported that at least 54 people had died 
in the previous day coordinated strikes 
by BH with 90 injured, but residents 
that were caught up in the explosions 
said as many as 85 lost their lives. The 
paper claimed that Nigerian Authority 
have continued to downplay the 
enormity of the attack. The Cable 
online news media in Nigeria did a 
detailed compilation of all BH attacks 
that took place in 2015, at the end of it; 
the death toll of all BH attacks in 2015 
alone was 4,780. 
 
The Information above has shown that 
in the last few years, BH has practically 
operated with impunity and without any 
serious hindrance from the Nigerian 
state. In just few years of their 
emergence, they have grown to become 
one of the world‟s most feared and 
deadliest terrorist groups. The extent at 
which they perpetrate violence on the 
Nigerian state seems unprecedented in 
the history of the country even as the 
data above has shown. The above 
information clearly exposes the fragility 
of the Nigerian state and its inability to 
perform its manifest function of law 
and order and security of lives and 
property.  
 
Boko Haram engages in well-
coordinated simultaneous attacks on a 
continual and daily bases across the 
northeastern zones even outside it to the 
northwest and federal capital territory, 
Abuja, they carry out targeted 
assassination and bank robbery and 
even take on security forces. Since 2009 
till date, the rate in which violence is 
been carried by Boko Haram on a daily 
basis is so enormous. The information 
above also shows that the state and its 
security apparatus cannot gather 
intelligence or lost the capacity because 
of the spate of the attacks. However, the 
most important is the fact that the BH 
violence is a war against the state. 
 
The context of violence that Boko 
Haram takes full advantages of the 
extant issue of state formation in 
Nigeria. This root cause is what is 
ignored and substituted with the 
conventional symptoms of 
unemployment, Islamic radicalism, 
porous border, corruption and the likes. 
The state is central in the emergence of 
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Boko Haram violence, the state 
formation determines the strength, 
capacity and preparedness of the state 
to handle issues such as Boko Haram 
irrespective of the number of times they 
occur. But porous and conflict based 
formation character of the state which 
itself is precarious and fragile making it 
susceptible to every wind that blows 
makes it prone to every dissent, the 
fragile formation itself is founded upon 
dissent. It is the fragile character of 
formation of the Nigerian state that 
reinforces dissent and violence directed 
at the state such as Boko Haram and 
these crises in turn further reinforces 
state fragility. Hence the much talked 
about problem of federalism, 
corruption, Islamic radicalism, porous 
border, bad leadership is all symptoms 
of state fragility. Thus the state fragility 
having its root from the character and 
formation of the Nigerian state explains 
the susceptibility of the Nigerian state 
to violence, why it lingers and never 
truly quelled except that it takes another 
shade.  
Conclusion 
This paper has established the centrality 
of the state in the Boko Haram 
violence. It explains the fact that state 
fragility is responsible for BH violence 
in Nigeria. The work however 
explained that even if the state defeats 
the BH terrorists, it might not be an end 
to violence against it, the reason being 
that the structures and the institutions of 
the state are designed in such a way that 
it gives room for dissent and anti-state 
struggles and until that context of 
fragility is addressed, even if BH 
violence is quelled, another is likely to 
arise. 
 
Recommendations 
The real issues need to be addressed 
and not the symptoms. The real issue is 
the crisis of state formation, the state in 
Nigeria is not original to the people 
hence majority of the people do not 
identify with it and all seek for their 
own state to cater for their needs. The 
fragility of the state in Nigeria is a 
function of its formation. The present 
nature of the Nigerian state would 
continue to give room for dissent and 
anti-state struggles. 
 
An overhauling of the Nigerian 
federalism and re-institutionalization of 
true federalism is recommended; this of 
course is not possible without a major 
amendment of the constitution. This 
amendment must be witnessed by 
representatives of the six geopolitical 
zones. Alternatively, a truly sovereign 
national conference, a genuine 
sovereign national conference that is 
not limited in the sphere of the matters 
it is meant to discuss, the so called no 
go areas must be the areas that must 
first and foremost be addressed is also 
recommended.  
 
Groups of people whether diverse or 
not must negotiate their way to 
statehood whether through war or 
through a round table. The state 
formation process and the state itself 
must be owned by the people and not a 
foreign infrastructure and to own the 
state is to own its formation process. 
Until this fundamental issue of state is 
addressed; even if the government 
succeeds in defeating BH, there are 
other groups armed to the teeth ready to 
take on the state to seek redress to their 
grievances
.  
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